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Abstract 
The objective of Sans Signature buffer overflow blocker mainly is to intercept communications between a 
server and client, analyse the contents for the presence of executable code and prevent the code reaching 
the server. In this project, Sans Signature is a signature free approach, which can identify and block new 
and unknown buffer overflow attacks. The system can intercept the data coming via various channels 
before the server receives the packets. Typically, the data exchanged with a standard application is the data 
related to the transaction. Therefore, the presence of executable code along with data is something 
unwarranted. This system will analyze the incoming of the data, check is it contains any executable code. If 
the executable code is found, the packet is dropped. If the data packet is found to be safe, it is allowed to 
pass through. The payload or data is analyzed at the application layer called Proxy based Sans Signature. 
The system has been designed to identify certain executable pattern that is considered harmful.  It also has a 
thresh hold limit beyond which, the packet will be considered to be discarded. Given the intelligence of the 
algorithm, it prevents most of the buffer overflow attacks. The system can handle the packet analysis in a 
transparent manner, thus making it suitable for deployment at Firewall/Application Gateway level. Hence, 
it is quite powerful and efficient with very low deployment and maintenance cost. 
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1. Introduction 
In computer system, buffer overflow is one of the most serious vulnerabilities. It is the root cause for most 
of the cyber attacks such as server breaking-in worms, zombies and botnets. A buffer overflow occurs 
during program execution when a fixed-size buffer has had too much of data copied into it. This causes the 
data to overwrite into adjacent memory locations, and depending on what is stored there, the behavior of 
the program itself might be affected. A buffer overflow attack may corrupt control flow or data without 
injecting code such as return-to-libc attacks and data-pointer modification. 
 
1.1 Existing System 
STILL, a real-time, out-of-the-box, signature-free, remote exploit binary code injection attack blocker to 
protect web servers. STILL is motivated by an important observation that the request messages to web 
servers are exclusively data and not binary executable code. Since remote exploits are typically binary 
executable code, this observation indicates that if we can precisely distinguish (service requesting) 
messages that contain binary code from those that do not contain any binary code, we can protect web 
servers as well as other Internet services (which accept data only) from binary code-injection attacks by 
blocking the messages that contain binary code. An application layer proxy-based STILL is deployed 
between the web server and the corresponding firewall to protect web servers. STILL (including static taint 
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analysis and initialization analysis) detect not only unobfuscated exploit code, traditional polymorphic and 
metamorphic exploit code, but also self-modifying and indirect jump obfuscation code that could easily 
defeat previous static analysis approaches. Indeed, STILL is robust to almost all anti-signature, anti-static-
analysis and anti-emulation obfuscation. STILL is signature free, thus it can block new and unknown 
remote code injection attacks such as zero-day exploit code. 
The new techniques used previously to detect self-modifying and indirect jump exploit code are called 
static taint analysis and initialization analysis. We observe that self-modifying and indirect jump exploit 
code first need acquire the absolute address of payload. Accordingly, we first try to find the piece of code 
which acquires the absolute address of pay-load at runtime from an instruction sequence. The variable 
which holds the absolute address will be marked tainted. Then, we use the static taint analysis approach to 
track the tainted values and detect whether tainted data are used in the ways that could indicate the presence 
of self-modifying and indirect jump exploit code. A tainted variable is propagated to a new tainted variable 
by data transfer instructions that move data (e.g., push, pop, move) and data operation  instructions that 
perform arithmetic or bit-logic operations on data (e.g., add, sub, xor). For data transfer instructions, the 
destination operand will be tainted if and only if the source operand is tainted. For data operation 
instructions, the destination operand will be tainted if and only if either source or destination operand is 
tainted. 
 
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a main component of PaX . Address-space 
randomization, can detect exploitation of all memory errors. Instruction set randomization  can detect all 
code injection attacks. Nevertheless, when these approaches detect an attack, the victim process is typically 
terminated. “Repeated attacks will require repeated and expensive application restarts, effectively rendering 
the service unavailable.”   
Detection of Data Flow Anomalies There are static or dynamic  methods to detect data flow anomalies in 
the software reliability and testing field. Static methods are not suitable in our case due to its slow speed; 
dynamic methods are not suitable either due to the need for real execution of a program with some inputs. 
 
2. Proposed System 
 
Sans Signature is a generic approach which does not require any pre-known patterns. Then, it uses the 
found patterns and a data flow analysis technique called program slicing to analyze the packet’s payload to 
see if the packet really contains code . 
Besides, they used a special rule to detect polymorphic exploit code which contains a loop. Although they 
mentioned that the above rules are initial sets and may require updating with time, it is always possible for 
attackers to bypass those pre-known rules. Moreover, more rules mean more overhead and longer latency in 
filtering packets. In contrast, Sans Signature exploits a different data flow analysis technique, which is 
much harder for exploit code to evade. 
 
2.1 Performance Evaluation 
 
2.1.1 Proxy –Based Sans Signature  
To evaluate the performance impact of Signature free to web servers, we implemented a proxy- based  
Sans Signature prototype. Fig. shows the architecture of  Sans Signature.     
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Figure 2.1.1 : The architecture of Sans Signature 
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Figure 1:  To create the opcode  values, the machine instructions are entered at debug.exe. 
Few  machine instructions entered to generate the more opcode values using machine instructions 
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Figure2 : The screen shows the  opcode values generated and stored in the buffer, and are compared with 
the input  data that enter the system.            
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Figure3: The screen shows the main page where the input data is entered to check whether any of the data 
matches with the opcode values 
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Figure4: Screen shows matched characters with the opcodes values which are harmful data (mixed with 
executable code). 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Performance Analysis 
 
The proposed paper is implemented in C Language on a Pentium-III PC with 20 GB hard-disk and 256 MB 
RAM with apache web server. The propose paper’s concepts shows efficient results and has been 
efficiently tested on different messages. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The proposed Sans Signature, an online signature-free out-of -the- box blocker that can filter code-injection 
buffer overflow attack message, one of the most serious cyber security threats. Sans Signature does not  
require any signatures, thus it can block new unknown attacks. Sans Signature is immunized from most 
attack-side code obfuscation methods and good for economical Internet wide deployment with little 
maintenance cost, negligible throughput degradation  and low performance overhead and also  enhances  
the complex patterns for instruction. 
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